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Abstract
We consider the impact of anticipated policy changes when agents
form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expec-
tations. To model this we assume that agents combine limited struc-
tural knowledge with a standard adaptive learning rule. We analyze
these issues using two well-known set-ups, an endowment economy
and the Ramsey model. In our set-up there are important deviations
from both rational expectations and purely adaptive learning. Our
approach could be applied to many macroeconomic frameworks.
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1 Introduction
The hypothesis of rational expectations has in recent decades been the main
paradigm for expectation formation in macroeconomics. The literature on
adaptive learning has provided support for rational expectations by showing
how, in many cases, boundedly rational agents with limited knowledge can
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converge to a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the long run. More
specifically, provided an appropriate stability condition is satisfied, REE is
an asymptotic outcome of the use of least-squares and related learning rules
by private agents.
In recent years, a new literature has developed emphasizing the impor-
tance of learning for policy design. This literature has several themes. First,
the conditions for stability of the REE under least-squares learning imply
constraints on the policy rule parameters — not all policies consistent with
an REE guarantee convergence of learning. Second, one can compare the
performance of diﬀerent policy rules under the learning dynamics. A third
aspect is the properties of the dynamic learning paths following a change in
the policy rule. This last strand is the starting point of the current paper.
Returning to rational expectations, one of its salient contributions has
been the idea that agents look forward and can anticipate the eﬀects of an
announced future shift in policy. This point was developed for the perfect
foresight case by Sargent and Wallace (1973b). Using the forward solution
emphasized by Sargent and Wallace (1973a), the analysis of the eﬀects of
anticipated policy changes was incorporated into graduate textbooks, e.g.
Blanchard and Fischer (1989), p. 219.1 Thus far, the literature on learning
and policy changes has only considered situations where the changes come
as a surprise to agents, i.e. the policy change is unanticipated, and agents
begin to learn the new equilibrium as data arrive after the policy change.
Such changes are examined in Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2001),
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Giannitsarou (2006). To our knowledge, no
paper has examined the dynamic learning paths when an announced policy
change is anticipated by the agents who do not have a complete structural
model of the economy.2
This paper proposes a learning model in which agents combine limited
structural knowledge about the economy with adaptive learning for other
variables that they need to forecast. An advantage of this approach is that it
is flexible in terms of the extent of structural knowledge that agents are as-
sumed to possess. Here we explore one natural case in which agents know the
government budget constraint and the announced policy shift, while knowl-
1Lucas (1976), of course, also examined the impact of policy changes within a single
policy regime.
2Evans and Ramey (1992), Evans and Ramey (1998) do combine forward-looking be-
havior with less than fully rational expectations However, in their approach agents know
the full structural economic model and are impeded by calculation costs.
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edge of the overall structure of the economy remains incomplete.
More specifically, we consider a simple competitive representative-agent
endowment economy in which the government purchases output for current
consumption and levies lump-sum taxes. In the baseline case, balanced-
budget spending changes are assumed and we analyze the dynamics arising
from permanent and temporary anticipated changes in government spend-
ing/taxation. In the simplest scenario, starting in a steady-state equilibrium
we suppose that the government announces a future permanent change in
government purchases and taxes. To make their consumption plans, agents
need to forecast future (real) interest rates and taxes. The future path of
taxes is the structural element that we provide to agents. However, agents
must forecast future interest rates using only the current history of data,
revising these forecasts over time in line with standard learning models.
In treating the eﬀects of anticipated policy changes under learning, the
issue of the length of the forecast horizon becomes clearly relevant. Much of
the literature on convergence to REE under adaptive learning assumes that
agents’ behavior is based on Euler rules that require only short-term forecasts.
These behavioral rules do not explicitly incorporate the intertemporal budget
constraint or transversality conditions, but satisfy these conditions ex-post
when learning is convergent. This is a convenient model of bounded rational-
ity that emphasizes short-horizon decision making under limited knowledge.
It is also possible to formulate a model of bounded rationality and adap-
tive learning in which agents explicitly use long or infinite-horizon decision
rules. See Sargent (1993), Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer (1998), Bullard
and Duﬀy (2001), and especially Preston (2005), Preston (2006).
In many cases the length of the forecast horizon is not central for the
question of the stability of REE under learning for a given policy rule. How-
ever, when considering announced policy changes, it is clearly natural to have
a forecasting horizon that at least includes the time of the actual policy shift.
In the current paper we therefore assume that private agents adopt an infinite
horizon. The results for balanced-budget spending changes are striking. In
line with the agents’ forward-looking behavior, there are immediate changes
in the interest rate and continued evolution over time. However, the result-
ing dynamics of interest rates under learning are in a sharp contrast to the
fully rational path. We also consider the case of repeated shifts in policy in
the context of the endowment economy, and show how our approach can be
extended to allow agents to incorporate information from previous episodes
of policy change.
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We extend our analysis to the case of debt financing and to the Ramsey
model, in which the dynamics of capital provide a new aspect to the dynamics
under learning and under perfect foresight. In these extensions we obtain
other surprising results. In the endowment model with debt financing, agents
are assumed to know the government budget constraints and to compute their
expected tax liabilities using interest rate forecasts and expected levels of
government debt. Numerical simulations show that there is “near Ricardian
equivalence”, i.e. the dynamic paths under learning with debt are very close
to the paths with learning in the balanced budget case, despite the substantial
diﬀerences from the perfect foresight path. Our final extension shows how
to apply our approach to the Ramsey model. Simulations show that, under
learning, announced future changes in government spending have immediate
eﬀects on consumption and the near-term evolution of capital. However, the
paths under learning are again substantially diﬀerent from perfect foresight
paths, exhibiting non-monotonicities in which initial overshooting leads to
corrections and cyclical convergence.
2 A Simple Endowment Economy
We consider a nonstochastic endowment economy model with exogenous out-
put y and no money. In the adaptive learning literature it is standard to
include stochastic shocks, and these could easily be included. However, our
central points can be made in a nonstochastic framework and this eases the
theoretical presentation and allows for clearer numerical illustrations.
There are a large number of identical households and each household
maximizes their utility Ut subject to a budget constraint:
Ut = max E∗t {
∞X
s=t
βs−t
c1−σs
1− σ} subject to (1)
bs = y − cs − τ s + rsbs−1.
where σ > 0 and 0 < β < 1. bs is net assets of the representative household in
period s; cs, τ s are their consumption and taxes in period s and rs is the gross
real interest rate factor on one-period safe loans from s− 1 to s, determined
at date s− 1. The Euler equation for consumption is
c−σt = βrt+1E
∗
t c
−σ
t+1. (2)
4
Here E∗t denotes potentially subjective expectations at time t and rt+1 is
assumed known at time t.3
Using forward substitution in the flow household budget constraint and
imposing the transversality condition,
lim
T→∞
D−1s,s+T bs+T = 0, (3)
yields the intertemporal budget constraint (4):
0 = rsbs−1 +
∞X
j=1
D−1s,s+jχs+j + χs, where (4)
χs+j = y − cs+j − τ s+j, for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . and Ds,s+j =
jQ
i=1
rs+i.
(The transversality condition will be automatically satisfied for the policies
that we consider.) From equation (2) we get
ct = β−
1
σ r−
1
σ
t+1c
e
t+1(t), (5)
where cet+1(t) is short-hand notation for E∗t ct+1. As there are no random
shocks we assume point expectations. Forward substitution of (5) gives
ct = β−
s
σ (
sY
i=1
ret+i(t))
− 1σ cet+s(t) or
cet+s(t) = ctβ
s
σ (
sY
i=1
ret+i(t))
1
σ ≡ ctβ
s
σ (Det,t+s(t))
1
σ . (6)
Here ret+i(t) refers to expectations of the interest rate rt+i formed at time t,
i.e., E∗t rt+i, and Det,t+s(t) denotes the expectations of the interest rate factor
Dt,t+s formed at time t, defined as follows:
Det,t+s(t) = rt+1
sQ
i=2
ret+i(t), s ≥ 2 and Det,t+1(t) = rt+1. (7)
Similarly, τ et+j(t) denotes the expected lump-sum tax in period t + j
forecasted at time t. Substituting (6) into (4) yields
0 = rtbt−1 +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1(y − τ et+j(t)− ctβ
j
σ (Det,t+j(t))
1
σ ) + y − ct − τ t,
3For simplicity, diﬀerent consumers are assumed to have identical expectations.
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where future dated variables are replaced by their expected values. Solving
for current consumption ct yields
ct(1 + SD(t)) = rtbt−1 + y − τ t + SN(t), where (8)
SN(t) ≡
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1(y − τ et+j), (9)
SD(t) ≡
∞X
j=1
βj/σ(Det,t+j(t))
σ−1−1. (10)
SN(t) is the expected present value of future expected net income and ct(1+
SD(t)) the expected present value of current and future consumption.
Note that ct in (8) depends on ret+i(t), τ et+j(t), rt+1, τ t, and rtbt−1. Ex-
pectations are assumed to be formed at the beginning of period t. The full
description of equilibrium requires specifying government tax and spending
policies. The market clearing condition in per capita terms
ct + gt = y
then determines ct and rt+1 given the expectations of the consumers.
3 Balanced Budget for Government
The general form of the government flow budget constraint (in per capita
terms) is
bt + τ t = gt + rtbt−1, (11)
where bt is government debt in the form of one-period risk-free real bonds
issued in period t and gt denotes government purchases in period t.
In this section, however, we assume that the government runs a balanced
budget and bonds are in zero net supply so that
τ t = gt, and bt−1 = 0.
Hence, bt in Section 2 may be interpreted as lending to other households and
this must equal zero in equilibrium.
Before considering the learning scenario, we consider what happens in
the benchmark rational expectations (RE) case when there is an announced
policy change in government spending at some time in the future.
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3.1 Benchmark RE case
At the beginning of period t = 1, a policy announcement is made that the
level of government spending will change permanently from g0 to g1 at a
specified date Tp in the future. The policy announcement is assumed to be
credible and known to the agents with certainty. With a balanced budget,
this means equivalently that there is an anticipated change in (per capita)
taxes, i.e., τ t = τ 0 = g0 when t < Tp and τ t = τ 1 = g1 when t ≥ Tp. From
the balanced budget and market clearing
ct = y − τ 0, for t < Tp
ct = y − τ 1, for t ≥ Tp.
The Euler equation (2) under perfect foresight gives us rt = β−1 when t <
Tp − 1. At date Tp − 1 the interest rate obtained from (2) is
rRETp = β
−1(
y − τ 1
y − τ 0
)σ, (12)
while rt = β−1 again for all t ≥ Tp.
Thus, if τ 1 > τ 0, the interest rate rRETp jumps down for one period, af-
ter which it immediately returns to its steady state value. The intuition is
straightforward. At date Tp− 1, since taxes are known to go up next period,
next period’s consumption will be lower relative to current consumption.
Hence, the interest rate between Tp− 1 and Tp must go down to ensure that
the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between Tp − 1 and Tp is
equal to the interest rate.
3.2 Learning under a balanced government budget
In the learning scenario, the policy announcement is assumed to take the
same form as in Section 3.1. In the standard adaptive learning approach,
private agents would need to forecast future taxes as well as interest rates,
since both are required for to solve for the optimal level of consumption us-
ing (8)-(10). We continue to follow this approach with respect to interest
rates, but take the radically diﬀerent approach for taxes of assuming that
agents understand the future course of taxes implied by the announced pol-
icy. In eﬀect we are giving the agents structural knowledge of one part of
the economy: the fiscal implications of the announced future change in gov-
ernment spending. To keep things simple we assume in this section (and in
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most of the paper) that the government operates and is known to operate
under a balanced-budget rule. Given this structural knowledge of the gov-
ernment budget constraint and the announced path of government spending,
the agents can thus use τ 0 = g0, for t < Tp, and τ 1 = g1, for t ≥ Tp, for their
forecasts of future taxes. Of course, for simplicity we are assuming that the
announced policy change is fully credible. It would be possible to relax this
assumption within the general framework of our approach.
We now turn to the formal details of the adaptive learning component of
the model. In forecasting interest rates we assume that agents do not have
adequate structural information. That is, we assume that private agents do
not know the complete economic structure and thus are not able to solve
for the path of future interest rates using an economic model. In particular,
because agents do not know that agents are identical, they cannot deduce
the path that interest rates will follow and must forecast future interest rates
using statistical procedures.4 To forecast future interest rates it is assumed
that private agents make forecasts using an econometric time-series model
and that its parameters are estimated using past data. The forecasts are
input to agent’s decision rules and in each period the economy attains an
equilibrium for the current period variables given the forecasts of the agents.
This temporary equilibrium provides a new data point, which in the next
period leads to re-estimation of the parameters, updating of the forecasts
and, in turn, to a new temporary equilibrium. The sequence of temporary
equilibria may generate parameter estimates that converge to a fixed point
corresponding to an REE for the economy. For a general discussion of adap-
tive learning see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
In our context, the economy will eventually reach a steady state after the
policy has been implemented. A natural way to model learning is to assume
that agents use observed interest rates to estimate their mean, which they
use to forecast future interest rates. These estimates are updated over time
as new data arrives. In the learning literature this is often called “steady-
state learning” since the agents are estimating a mean rather than a more
complex time series model. Diﬀerent assumptions about the computation
of the mean have been used in the literature. One possibility is the simple
arithmetic mean while another is to allow for diﬀerent weights on the data.
4The calculation of RE interest rates in (12) requires that agents know their consump-
tion to be y− τ i, i = 0, 1, before and after the tax change. This knowledge in turn comes
from common knowledge that agents are identical and there is market clearing.
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It is assumed below that agents use exponential discounting of past data,
an assumption commonly used in the learning literature when agents are
concerned that structural changes may be occurring.
Under steady-state learning, agents use past data to estimate the mean
interest rate, which is then used as the forecast of future interest rates for all
horizons, i.e.
ret+i(t) = r
e(t) for all i ≥ 2
so that from (7)
Det,t+s(t) = rt+1r
e(t)s−1.
We make the assumption of steady-steady learning, even though policy-
induced structural changes will be occurring in the future, because without
adequate knowledge of the complete economic structure, agents have no way
to forecast the pattern of future interest rates that will result from the policy
change, except through past observations of interest-rates and their evolution
as time progresses.5
Assuming zero debt, the consumption function (8) in equilibrium implies
that
ct =
y − τ t + SN(t)
1 + SD(t)
, (13)
where SN(t) and SD(t) are defined in (9) and (10). It is assumed throughout
that expectations satisfy βσ
−1
re(t)σ−1−1 < 1 and re(t) > 1, so that all the
relevant sums are finite. Imposing the market clearing condition ct = y − gt
and the balanced budget condition τ t = gt yields
(y − gt)SD(t) = SN(t). (14)
The expressions for SD(t) and SN(t) take the form:
SD(t) = rσ
−1−1
t+1 β
σ−1 1
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
, (15)
5If we were to consider repeated policy changes, then agents could use past imple-
mentations of policy change to provide information on the time profile of the impact of
an announced policy change. We consider this issue below in Section 4. Note also that
the agents are assumed not to have the structural information that the interest rate will
eventually return to the original steady state value β−1. This assumption could be easily
altered.
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SN(t) =
y − τ 0 + (τ 0 − τ 1)(re(t))t+1−Tp
rt+1(1− (re(t))−1)
for t = 1, 2, ..., Tp − 1, and
SN(t) ≡
y − τ 1
rt+1(1− (re(t))−1)
for t ≥ Tp.
The corresponding values for rt+1 are
rt+1 = [
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
βσ
−1
(1− (re(t))−1)
{1− (τ 1 − τ 0)
(y − τ 0)
(re(t))t+1−Tp}]σ for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1,
rt+1 = [
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
βσ
−1
(1− (re(t))−1)
]σ for t ≥ Tp.
3.3 Permanent changes in policy
To obtain analytical results, we specialize to the case of logarithmic utility,
i.e. σ = 1. We have
rt+1 = H(re(t), t), where
H(re(t), t) =
(
1−β
β(1−(re(t))−1) [1−
(τ1−τ0)
(y−τ0) (r
e(t))t+1−Tp ], 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1
1−β
β(1−(re(t))−1) , t ≥ Tp.
(16)
We now study this system under “steady state” learning with exponential
discounting. The steady-state learning algorithm is simply
re(t+ 1) = re(t) + γ(rt+1 − re(t)),
where 0 < γ < 1 is referred to as the “gain” parameter that measures the
extent to which past data is discounted.6 Under this algorithm the relative
weight on data j periods earlier is (1 − γ)j, i.e. past data is discounted at
rate 1− γ. The optimal choice of γ is not straightforward and is most nat-
urally addressed in a stochastic framework, since it involves a trade-oﬀ of
“filtering” and “tracking.” Lower values of γ more eﬀectively filter out ran-
dom noise, while higher values of γ are better at tracking structural change.
Because the optimal choice of γ in general, and in the current context, is not
straightforward, we treat γ as a given parameter.7
6Under traditional “least-squares learning” all data receives an equal weight. This
corresponds to a decreasing gain sequence γt = 1/t, where t is the sample size.
7See Evans and Ramey (2006) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Chapter 14, for a
discussion of the choice of γ in stochastic models with structural change.
10
Combining the temporary equilibrium equation with the constant gain
learning algorithm we arrive at the dynamic equation for expectations,
re(t+ 1) = re(t) + γ(H(re(t), t)− re(t)).
Assume that the economy is initially at the steady state. We have the fol-
lowing analytical results for the impact of the policy change.8
Proposition 1 Assume that the economy is initially in a steady state and
consider a permanent government spending and tax increase τ 1 > τ 0, which
takes place in period Tp and which is announced during period 1. Under
learning, for all γ > 0 suﬃciently small we have:
(a) Interest rate expectations satisfy (1 − γ)−1 < re(t) < β−1 for all t ≥ 2
and limt→∞ re(t) = β−1.
(b) The actual temporary equilibrium interest rate rt+1 satisfies:
(i) rt+1 < β−1 for t = 1, . . . , Tp − 1,
(ii) rt+1 > β−1for t ≥ Tp and limt→∞ rt+1 = β−1.
Thus, under learning, an announced future permanent increase in govern-
ment spending leads to low interest rates before Tp, the time of the policy
change, and high interest rates on and after Tp, with interest rates eventu-
ally converging back to its steady-state value. This is a very diﬀerent pattern
from the outcome under fully rational expectations.
Figures 1 and 2 provide numerical illustrations of the dynamics of the
interest rate and interest rate expectations under learning.9 The figures
assume σ = 1, β = 0.95, y = 6, γ = 1/50, g0 = τ 0 = 0.9, g1 = τ 1 = 1.1
and Tp = 20. The learning dynamics are assumed to start at the steady state
that prevails before the announced policy change, i.e., r1 = re(1) = β−1.
Figure 1 illustrates that the dynamics of the interest rate under learning
are strikingly diﬀerent from the RE dynamics. Under learning, at t = 1,
there is an instantaneous drop in the interest rate r2. To understand this,
note that the present value of consumers’ expected net future incomes SN(t)
must be constant in all periods up to Tp − 1, since from equation (14), the
left side is constant with log utility in all periods up to Tp − 1. The eﬀect
of higher anticipated taxes by itself is to reduce SN(1). Since interest rate
expectations in period 1, re(1), are pre-determined at the beginning of the
period (assumed to be at the steady state), the current interest rate r2 has
to fall to keep SN(1) constant in temporary equilibrium.
8Proofs of propositions are in the Appendix.
9The numerical routines are available on request.
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Figure 1: rt+1 under learning (solid line) and rREE under rational expecta-
tions (dashed line), balanced-budget case with the permanent policy change.
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t
1.0515
1.052
1.0525
rte
Figure 2: Interest rate expectations, balanced budget case with permanent
policy change. The dashed line is the steady state value β−1.
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Figure 2 illustrates that interest rate expectations always stay below the
steady state value β−1, as proved in Proposition 1. They decrease monoton-
ically from this steady state value till date Tp before rising monotonically
towards β−1 thereafter.10 The sharp fall in r2 induces a gradual reduction
in interest rate expectations. A lower value of re(t) by itself acts to reduce
the discount factors Det,t+j(t) and to increase SN(t), but the latter must be
constant up to Tp − 1. The subsequent upward movements of rt+1 after the
initial drop at date 1 compensate for this and keep SN(t) constant. In other
words, lower future expectations of the interest rate increase the expected
present value of future net incomes, which by itself increases planned current
consumption. But since in equilibrium actual consumption cannot change in
this endowment economy, the current interest rate rises to encourage savings
and clear the market. Note that relatively small variations in re(t) can have
substantial eﬀects on rt+1 due to the impact on present values.
In the period Tp− 1, just before the actual policy change, under rational
expectations, there is a sudden sharp fall in rRETp whereas under learning,
there is only a small change in rTp . Most prominently, Figure 1 shows that
the actual interest rate under learning in the subsequent period Tp spikes
upwards, overshooting the steady state value before gradually converging
to the steady state. Under rational expectations, on the other hand, the
interest rate reverts immediately to its steady state value in period Tp. The
big upward spike in rTp+1 under learning also reverses the initial decline in
re(t) up to this date and induces a gradual increase in re(t), from period
Tp + 1 onwards, towards the steady state value in Figure 2. The latter also
explains the monotonic decline in the actual interest rate towards the steady
state after period Tp, seen in Figure 1, since from equation (16), for all dates
t ≥ Tp, rt+1 is decreasing in re(t).11
Proposition 1, and Proposition 2 below, state formal results for the “small
gain” case. This is the case usually examined in the theoretical literature on
adaptive learning, e.g. Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002), and empirical
estimates of γ in the constant gain case are typically in the range γ = 0.02
to γ = 0.05 for quarterly macro data (see Orphanides and Williams (2005)
and Branch and Evans (2006)). As discussed above, the appropriate value of
10This qualitative feature seems robust numerically but we have been unable to prove
this analytically.
11Most qualitative features of the dynamics mentioned in our discussion are robust to
variations in Tp, g0 and g1. However, the detailed dynamics of the actual interest rate
between periods 2 and Tp − 1 depend on the parameters, especially on Tp.
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γ will depend on the importance of random shocks to the economy as well as
the size and frequency of structural change. Relatively small values of γ are
usually examined because applied macroeconomic models invariably include
a large role for random shocks that would need to be filtered out by agents
when making forecasts.
3.4 Temporary Policy Changes
The other natural fiscal policy experiment to consider is a change in gov-
ernment spending that is only temporary. We consider the following policy
experiment, assumed fully credible and announced at the start of period 1:
gt = τ t =
⎧
⎨
⎩
g0, t = 0, ..., Tg1 − 1
g1, t = Tg1, ..., Tg2 − 1
g0, t ≥ Tg2,
i.e., government spending and taxes are changed in period Tg1 and this change
is reversed at a later period Tg2.
The Appendix works out the details under learning. Again it is convenient
to focus on the case of log utility, for which
rt+1 = F (re(t), t) =
1− β
β(1− (re(t))−1)F˜ (r
e(t), t),
where
F˜ (re(t), t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[1− (τ1−τ0)
(y−τ0) (r
e(t))t+1−Tg1(1− re(t)Tg1−Tg2)], 1 ≤ t ≤ Tg1 − 1
[1 + (τ1−τ0)
(y−τ1) (r
e(t))t+1−Tg2 ], Tg1 ≤ t ≤ Tg2 − 1
1, t ≥ Tg2.
.
(17)
Under steady state learning with constant gain, the expectations are ad-
justed according to the algorithm
re(t+ 1) = re(t) + γ(F (re(t), t)− re(t)). (18)
Again we provide formal results for the main features of the solution under
learning and then illustrate the quantitative details numerically.
Proposition 2 Assume that the economy is initially in the steady state and
consider a temporary government spending and tax increase τ 1 > τ 0, which
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takes place in period Tg1 and is reversed in period Tg2 > Tg1, with the policy
announced during period 1. Under learning, for all γ > 0 suﬃciently small,
we have:
(a) re(t) < β−1 in periods t = 2, . . . , Tg1, re(t) > β−1 for t ≥ Tg2 and
limt→∞ re(t) = β−1.
(b) rt+1 < β−1 for t < Tg1, rTg1+1 > β
−1, rt+1 < β−1 for t ≥ Tg2 and
limt→∞ rt+1 = β−1.
We remark that for Tg1 + 1 ≤ t ≤ Tg2 − 1 the qualitative results are not
theoretically clear-cut.
Under RE, with this temporary policy change, we have rt+1 = β−1 when-
ever 1 ≤ t ≤ Tg1 − 2, Tg1 ≤ t ≤ Tg2 − 2 and for all t ≥ Tg2, while at dates
Tg1 − 1 and Tg2 − 1, interest rates are given by
rTg1 = β
−1(
y − g1
y − g0
), rTg2 = β
−1(
y − g0
y − g1
).
Thus, for a temporary increase in government spending the impact under
RE is a double spike, with a one-period decrease in the interest rate in the
period of the increase in government spending and a one-period increase
in the interest rate when government spending reverts to its previous level.
The reason behind these changes is the same as in Section 3.1. This solution
provides the benchmark RE dynamics, with which we compare the learning
dynamics. In our numerical experiment we assume that the parameter values
are as before, except that Tg1 = 20, Tg2 = 40.
The dynamics of actual interest rates under learning and under RE, in
the balanced-budget case with the temporary policy change, are illustrated in
Figure 3. Figure 4 shows the corresponding interest-rate expectations. The
dynamics of interest rates under learning (and under RE) until date Tg1 are
qualitatively similar to the case illustrated in Figure 1. This is because Tg1 is
the point of implementation of the first policy change here (which corresponds
to Tp in Section 3.2). In particular, the interest rate under learning at date 1
falls immediately, and in period Tg1 it overshoots the steady state value. The
dynamics of interest rates after period Tg1 tend to go in opposite directions
to the dynamics before period Tg1. This is because the agents (correctly)
anticipate that the policy change will be reversed at the later date Tg2. The
interest rate stays above the steady state from period Tg1 to period Tg2 − 1
until it spikes downwards at Tg2 and undershoots the steady state value.
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Figure 3: rt+1 under learning (solid line) and rREE under rational expecta-
tions (dashed line), balanced-budget case with a temporary policy change.
Figure 4 shows that interest rate expectations re(t) tend to fall until pe-
riod Tg1 before rising thereafter until date Tg2. The turn-around in interest
rate expectations comes about in period Tg1+1 since the interest rate at Tg1
spikes upward (see Figure 3) which causes these expectations to rise gradu-
ally thereafter. re(t) continues to increase till date Tg2 before monotonically
decreasing towards the steady state value. The decline in re(t) from Tg2 on-
wards arises due to the big downwards spike in the actual interest rate at
date Tg2 when the policy change is reversed.12 Finally, the monotonic decline
in re(t) from Tg2 onwards explains the subsequent monotonic upward move-
ment in the actual interest rate, since the interest rate for periods t ≥ Tg2 is
decreasing in re(t), as shown in (17).
The results for both permanent and temporary policy changes can be
summarized as follows. Our framework provides private agents with partial
structural knowledge of the economy, specifically the future course of gov-
ernment spending and taxes, but requires agents to use a simple statistical
forecasting method for future values of other aggregate variables, specifically
interest rates. In line with standard RE results in many models, we find
that announced future changes in policy have immediate eﬀects on endoge-
12We remark that re(t) goes above the steady state value in period Tg1 + 2 and stays
above this value thereafter.
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Figure 4: Interest-rate expectations, balanced budget case with the tempo-
rary policy change. The dashed line is the steady state value of β−1.
nous variables. However, the resulting time paths are also strikingly diﬀerent
from the one those that would result from fully rational expectations: where
RE leads to interest-rate spikes we find that under learning these spikes can
be reversed in sign and somewhat delayed. Although these results are spe-
cific to the model examined, they show that anticipated policy changes under
learning can have qualitative dynamics that are very diﬀerent from RE.
4 LearningWith Repeated Policy Implemen-
tations
In Section 3.4, we considered the eﬀect of an anticipated temporary policy
change under learning dynamics. The policy change considered was a once
and for all change in the sense that it was never repeated. We think this type
of policy change is realistic in the sense that policy changes often have unique
features, so that frequent repetitions of exactly the same policy change are
unlikely. Still, it is of interest to consider the implications under learning if
such repetitions do occur, so that agents have the possibility of learning over
time across policy experiments.
We thus now consider a situation in which the same policy change is
repeated over time and in which the agents have access to data on these
17
repeated policy changes and use this data to update their interest rate path
forecasts. One might expect in these circumstances that agents’ behavior
over time, under this type of learning dynamics, might converge to the one
predicted under RE for these anticipated policy changes. We will see that this
is the case, though convergence can be quite slow, with substantial qualitative
diﬀerences from RE remaining for many repetitions.
To keep the analysis simple, we consider repeated one-period government
spending shocks under a balanced budget. More precisely, each policy change
considered by the agent is assumed to be of the form
gt = τ t =
⎧
⎨
⎩
g0, t = 0, ..., Tg1 − 1
g1, t = Tg1
g0, t > Tg1.
Since we are considering repeated policy changes, this specification is not
fully correct for t > Tg1, but we will assume that each repetition is suﬃ-
ciently far in the future that with discounting the future implementations can
be ignored. We also assume logarithmic preferences throughout this section.
The consumption function is as in (13) and the balanced budget assumption
together with market clearing leads to (14). For notational convenience we
will treat each policy implementation as announced at time t = 1 and imple-
mented at time t = Tg1 and use n = 1, 2, 3, . . . to denote the number of the
implementation.
We design the learning rule so that it allows both for learning within
each implementation of the policy (as earlier) and also learning across im-
plementations. When a temporary policy change is announced we assume
that agents have an initial forecast of the interest rate path, based on pre-
vious implementations. For the first implementation we will assume that
this initial path is simply the steady-state constant path, in line with the
earlier sections of this paper (this is discussed further below). For the nth
policy implementation we denote this initial forecast path of one-period in-
terest rates by rˆe(t, n), for t = 2, 3, . . .. Learning across implementations is
based on an updating of these initial forecast paths using data from the last
implementation, according to the algorithm
rˆe(t, n+ 1) = rˆe(t, n) + κ(rt+1(n)− rˆe(t, n)),
for t = 1, 2, .., TH , where rt+1(n) denotes the actual interest rate path from
implementation n. Here TH denotes a forecast horizon, beyond which we
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assume ret+1(t, n) = β
−1 for t > TH , and 0 < κ ≤ 1 is the gain parameter
across policy implementations.
We continue to allow for learning within each implementation. That is,
during implementation n the expectation path rˆe(t, n) is updated over time
according to previous forecast errors within the implementation. We denote
the resulting expectations by ret (t+ 1 + i, n), which denotes the expectation
at t, during implementation n, of the one-period interest-rate factor rt+1+i.
We assume that the within implementation updating is given by
ret (t+ 1 + i, n) = rˆ
e(t+ 1 + i, n) + Φ(t), where
Φ(t) = γ
t−1X
j=1
(1− γ)j (rt−j(n)− rˆe(t− j − 1, n)) ,
where 0 < γ < 1 is, as before, the gain for learning within an implementa-
tion.13 The future expected interest rate path, during implementation n at
time t, is then given by ret+1+i = ret (t+ 1 + i, n) for i = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
It is easy to verify that for n = 1, i.e. for the first implementation,
this learning scheme is identical to the one used in earlier sections, provided
rˆe(t, 1) = β−1 for all t. Put diﬀerently, the learning scheme analyzed in
earlier sections can be viewed as assuming a flat prior path for interest rate
forecasts, set at the mean steady-state value. This is natural, since in the first
implementation of the future policy change there is no historical experience
to draw upon. However, there are circumstances in which an alternative
initial path for rˆe(t, 1) would be plausible. This would be natural if there
had been previous policy changes which, while diﬀerent, were believed to
provide some qualitative information about the likely path of interest rates.
An important issue in practice is the choice of gains γ and κ. As discussed
in Section 3.3, this issue is more properly addressed in a stochastic setting,
since there is a trade-oﬀ between the tracking ability of higher gains to reduce
bias and the filtering benefits of lower gains to reduce random variability. In
particular, how much the expected interest rate path should be revised in
light of data from the previous policy change, i.e. the best choice of κ, will
depend on the relative importance of random shocks across implementations.
We leave this important issue for future research, and here illustrate the im-
plications of learning with repeated policy changes in a nonstochastic model
with given κ.
13A more general formulation would relace Φ(t) by Φ(t)w(i), where w(i) > 0 is a non-
negative “kernel”, which is decreasing in i.
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Given interest forecasts, we determine the actual interest rate path rt+1
from (14) for 1 ≤ t ≤ TH . We continue to assume that τ et+s = τ t+s i.e., agents
predict taxes correctly from knowledge of the government budget constraint.
From (14) we can obtain, for 1 ≤ t ≤ TH − 1, the actual interest rate path
rt+1 = rt+1(n), for policy implementation n, generated by expectations ret+i+1,
namely
rt+1(y − gt)
β
1− β = y − τ
e
t+1 +∆t, where
∆t ≡
∞X
s=2
(
s−1Q
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(y − τ et+s).
For notational convenience, we are dropping the index for implementation n
and writing rt+1 = rt+1(n). Note that in contrast to earlier sections, at each t
agents are now forecasting a time-varying path for future interest rates, and
this is reflected in the agents’ behavior and summarized by ∆t. As shown in
the Appendix, the interest rate path rt+1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ TH − 1, is given by
rt+1(y − gt)
β
1− β = y − gt+1 +
TH−1X
s=2
(
s−1Q
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(y − gt+s) +
(y − g0)(
βt−1
1− β )(
TH−tQ
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1) (19)
We now present a numerical illustration. We report the diﬀerence in
interest rates from the RE. The RE interest rate path is given by rt+1 = β−1
for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tg1 − 2, and for all t ≥ Tg1 + 1 while at dates Tg1 − 1 and Tg1,
the interest rates are
rTg1 = β
−1(
y − g1
y − g0
), rTg1+1 = β
−1(
y − g0
y − g1
).
The results are shown in Figure 8. To generate the Figure, we used parameter
values σ = 1, β = 0.95, y = 6, γ = 1/200, κ = 1/20, g0 = τ 0 = 0.9, g1 = τ 1 =
1.1, Tg1 = 20, and TH = 40.
As is clear from the figure, after a suﬃcient number of policy iterations,
the interest rate forecasts do tend to converge to the interest rate dynam-
ics under RE with the announced one period policy change in government
spending. This result seems to be robust to changes in Tg1, g0, and g1. At
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Figure 5: Diﬀerence between the RE values and the interest rate forecasts
when the policy change is repeated. The diﬀerences are plotted for the second
iterate (dashed line), the 25th iterate (solid light grey line), 50th iterate
(solid medium grey line) and the 100th iterate (solid black line). Note the
convergence towards the RE values as the number of iterations increases.
the same time it is apparent that convergence can be quite slow, especially
when the gain parameters γ and κ are relatively small.14
On the one hand the results of this section are reassuring. Given repeated
implementations of a preannounced policy change, we have shown how an
adaptive learning rule will eventually arrive at RE forecasts for the interest
rate path resulting from the policy change. On the other hand, our results
also illustrate the extreme assumptions required for this result. We need
repeated implementation of the same policy, namely a one-period balanced-
budget increase in government spending, announced Tg1 periods in advance,
with each repetition occurring after an interval of time suﬃciently long for
their discounted eﬀects to be negligible. Repeated policy changes with vari-
ations in the duration of the temporary increase in government spending,
or in the shape of government spending over the duration, or in the length
of the announcement period Tg1 , would render learning across repetitions
14We remark, however, that instability can arise for larger gains. Stability depends
jointly on the sizes of the two gain parameters and appears to involve a trade-oﬀ between
the sizes of the two gains.
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much more diﬃcult. Repetitions that were not after long intervals could be
handled, provided the interval period were constant, but variations in this
interval would cause diﬃculties for learning. If changes in temporary govern-
ment spending and the length of the announcement period were modeled as
a stochastic process, asymptotic convergence to RE would require that this
process be stationary and that agents fully understand the stochastic process
underlying policy changes.
Realistically, many policy changes have unique features, so that the pol-
icy shift cannot plausibly be viewed as the realization of a stationary process.
The conclusion we draw is the basic framework of this paper developed in
Sections 2 and 3 provides a realistic way to model the impact of announced
policy changes that are viewed as going beyond or fundamentally changing an
established policy rule. In these circumstances, agents would naturally com-
bine available structural information about future changes in key variables,
such as tax rates, with adaptive learning for other variables such as inter-
est rates. The current section shows how this framework can be extended
to cases in which there is additional information from earlier policy changes
considered relevant. If one or more earlier policy change are suﬃciently sim-
ilar that previous data can be used as a benchmark, the adaptive learning
rule used by agents can incorporate this information using the procedures of
the current section. If previous implementations have been quite diﬀerent,
but still have enough similarity to suggest useful qualitative information, this
can be incorporated by initializing the within-implementation learning with
a suitable subjectively adjusted prior for rˆe(t, 1).
In the next two sections we illustrate how our methodology can be ex-
tended to more complicated economic set-ups. In examining these exten-
sions we return to the Section 3 perspective of anticipated policy changes
with unique features, in which any earlier policy changes are considered not
to provide useful information about the likely course of interest rates and
related endogenous variables.
5 Debt Financing
We now allow the government to issue debt in the form of one-period risk-free
real bonds to finance its deficits. The government flow budget constraint (11)
implies the following intertemporal budget constraint, assuming the transver-
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sality condition (3) is satisfied.15
0 = rsbs−1 +
∞X
j=1
(Des,s+j)
−1(gs+j − τ s+j) + (gs − τ s).
We now introduce a particular change in government policy that leads to
debt financing.16 Assume that gt = g¯0 up to some future time Tp1 > 0 and
a diﬀerent target level of spending g¯1 thereafter. The level of the lump-sum
tax is assumed to change at some later time Tp2 from a level δ0 to a new
level δ1 such that this covers the new level of government spending g¯1 and
the steady state interest burden on the accumulated debt bTp2−1. Thus,
τ t =
½
δ0, t < Tp2,
δ1, t ≥ Tp2,
, where
δ1 ≡ g¯1 + (β−1 − 1)bTp2−1
and Tp2 is assumed to be bigger than Tp1. The actual level of government
spending after Tp2 is also adjusted to account for any deviations of the interest
rate from its long-run steady state value. Thus,
gt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
g¯0, t < Tp1
g¯1, Tp1 ≤ t < Tp2
g¯1 − (rt − β−1)bTp2−1, t ≥ Tp2.
This policy change is announced to agents at the beginning of period 1 and
they take it to be fully credible. Note that the level of government spending
and the debt will stabilize in the long run as rt → β−1.
By Ricardian equivalence, under rational expectations the dynamics of
interest rates will be the same as in the balanced budget case. We take up
the question of whether Ricardian equivalence will continue to hold under
learning. In our fiscal set-up, private agents under learning need to forecast
not only future interest rates but also the level of public debt at time Tp2−1,
since this determines subsequent taxes.
We assume that private agents forecast interest rates as in Section 3.3,
and through time Tp2 − 1 they assume taxes will be set at their announced
15As mentioned earlier, this will be true for the policies we consider.
16Naturally, one could consider various cases of debt finance and we focus on the chosen
case for brevity and concreteness.
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value of δ0. Forecasts of taxes τ t for t ≥ Tp2, however, require forecasts of
bTp2−1. Here we make the assumption that private agents understand the
flow (per capita) budget identity (11), iterate it forward to Tp2 − 1, and
use the announced path of future government spending, together with their
interest-rate forecasts, to estimate bTp2−1 and hence taxes after period Tp2.
The resulting consumption function and the solution for the equilibrium
interest-rate path under learning are obtained in the Appendix. For the case
of logarithmic preferences we have
rt+1[β(1− β)−1(y − gt)− (gt − τ t + rtbt−1)] =
y
1− re(t)−1 − Q˜(t),
where
Q˜(t) =
(
δ0+(δe1(t)−δ0)(re(t))
−(Tp2−1−t)
1−re(t)−1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp2 − 1
δ1(1− re(t)−1)−1 for t ≥ Tp2.
Computation of rt+1 for t ≥ Tp2 is straightforward. However, for 1 ≤ t ≤
Tp2 − 1, it is necessary to compute δe1(t) and hence beTp2−1(t) as detailed in
the Appendix.
It is necessary to resort to numerical computations to analyze this case of
debt financing. The dynamics of the diﬀerence in actual interest rates under
learning with debt finance (rdebtt+1 ) and the balanced-budget case (rbbt+1) are
illustrated in Figure 6. In the case of debt finance, δ0 = g0, Tp1 = 20 (which
was the value of Tp in the balanced budget case) and Tp2 = 30. The initial
value of debt is assumed to be zero and other initial conditions are as in the
balanced budget case illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
The interest rate dynamics with debt under learning are almost identical
to the balanced budget case (note the scale of the vertical axis in Figure 3).
Thus, there is near Ricardian equivalence despite bounded rationality and
large deviations from fully rational expectations of the interest rates. Quan-
titatively, there are only very small diﬀerences, with interest rates slightly
lower under debt financing before the actual implementation of the change in
government spending and slightly higher interest rates under debt financing
after the change. In other words, the interest rate is slightly more volatile
under debt financing.
The central explanation for the near Ricardian equivalence is that the
agents have been endowed with full knowledge of the structure of government
financing including, in particular, the way taxes and government spending
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Figure 6: Diﬀerence between interest rates with debt financing and balanced
budget, permanent policy change.
will be reconciled with the intertemporal budget constraint. Deviations of
expectations from full rationality, even though these are quite large, as seen
in Section 3.3, make only very small diﬀerences to the outcome with debt vs.
balanced-budget financing.
6 The Ramsey Model
While the endowment economy model has been convenient for setting forth
our approach to expectation formation and analyzing how its results diﬀer
from both rational expectations and purely adaptive learning, it should be
clear that our approach can be applied in most macroeconomic frameworks.
In this section we illustrate this point by showing how to extend the analysis
to a model with capital, i.e. the discrete-time Ramsey model.
The basic economic framework is standard. The production function in
intensive form is given by yt = f(kt), where Yt is output, Kt is capital, Lt is
labour, kt = Kt/Lt, yt = Yt/Lt, and f(k) ≡ F (k, 1), where F (K,L) is the
underlying production function with constant returns to scale. For simplicity,
we assume that labour is supplied inelastically and we normalize per capita
labour supply to be equal to 1. There is no population and productivity
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growth and no depreciation of the capital stock.
Profit maximization by firms entails that the gross interest rate rt and
the real wage rate wt satisfy
rt = 1 + f 0(kt), (20)
wt = f(kt)− ktf 0(kt). (21)
Household’s utility function is still given by (1) and the flow household
budget constraint in per capita terms is
kt+1 = wt + rtkt − ct − τ t,
where τ t denotes per capita lump-sum tax. For simplicity, we assume that
the government budget is balanced, i.e. τ t = gt, where gt is real government
spending on goods. The intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer is
0 = rtkt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1(wet+j − cet+j − τ et+j) + wt − ct − τ t
for given expectations
©
ret+j
ª
,
©
wet+j
ª
,
©
τ et+j
ª
. The same formula holds un-
der perfect foresight, with the equilibrium path substituted in place of the
expectations. As before, we also substitute the iterated Euler equation in
the form (6) to get
ct
"
1 +
∞X
j=0
βj/σ(Det,t+j)
σ−1−1
#
= rtkt + wt − τ t +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1(wet+j − τ et+j),
(22)
which defines the consumption function
ct = c
¡©
ret+j
ª
,
©
wet+j
ª
,
©
τ et+j
ª
, wt, rtkt
¢
.
Market clearing determines kt+1 from
kt+1 = f(kt)− ct − gt + kt, (23)
given the consumption function, the wage rate (21), the interest rate (20),
a sequence {gt+s} together with the government budget constraint τ t+j =
gt+j, and expectations. We continue to assume that the consumers have full
knowledge of the government budget constraint so that τ et+j = τ t+j .
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As a benchmark, we recall the analysis of anticipated policy changes
under perfect foresight.17 The policy announcement considered is the same
as in Section 3.1, i.e., at t = 1 it is announced that there will be a once-
for-all increase in government spending from gt = g0 = τ 0 when t < Tp
to gt = g1 = τ 1 when t ≥ Tp. Assuming that the economy is at a steady
state at t = 0, the perfect foresight equilibrium leads to an instantaneous
drop in consumption at t = 1 and a gradual decline thereafter such that at
time Tp consumption is at the saddle path associated with the new steady
state. After time Tp there is further monotonic decline to the new steady
state in accordance with the saddle-point stable dynamics. The capital stock
initially increases monotonically from t = 1 till period Tp before declining
monotonically thereafter towards the new steady state. The dynamics of the
interest and wage rates mirror the dynamics of capital in view of equations
(20) and (21).
Returning to the analysis of learning, we consider how the dynamics of ct
and kt evolve when agents must forecast the future paths
©
ret+j
ª
,
©
wet+j
ª
as
they have much less knowledge of the economy than under perfect foresight.
We will assume that forecasts of rt+j and wt+j are done using steady state
learning with constant gain, i.e. agents’ forecasts are given by
ret+j(t) = r
e(t), (24)
wet+j(t) = w
e(t) (25)
as in Section 3.2. This assumption is a plausible simplified approach in the
current setting for the following reason.
More generally, agents’ perceptions might take into account the hypothe-
sis that rt, wt depend on the capital stock kt in view of equations and (20)-(21)
and that the capital stock evolves gradually, i.e. depends on its lagged value
kt−1 as in (23). In other words, agents might estimate the parameters κr, ϕr,
κw, ϕw, κk, ϕk of the linear relations rt = κr + ϕrkt, wt = κw + ϕwkt and
kt = κk + ϕkkt−1.18 However, in the current nonstochastic setting, it is not
possible to statistically estimate both the intercept and slope parameters of
these relations because of emerging perfect multicollinearity as the economy
converges to the steady state. In the nonstochastic setting agents can only
17The details are well explained in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2003), Chapter 11. See in
particular Figure 11.3.1 and Section 11.6.
18Note that the linearized saddle-path dynamics of the RE equilibrium take this form
for specific values of the parameters κr, ϕr, κw, ϕw, κk, ϕk.
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estimate the long-run steady state values r¯ and w¯.19 For a discussion of
the subtle diﬀerences of learning in deterministic and stochastic models see
Evans and Honkapohja (1998).
Coming back to the analysis, we also assume that current consumption
by the agents is determined before the value of rt+1 is known, in other words
ret+1(t) = re(t), and so consumption is thus fully determined by expecta-
tions and current variables wt, τ t and rtkt, which are predetermined.20 Then
equation (23) determines kt+1 (and hence rt+1) as a residual. One could also
adopt the alternative formulation whereby consumption depends on the ac-
tual value of rt+1 and in this case kt+1 and rt+1 are simultaneously determined
by equations (23), (22) and (20).
In what follows, we assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
i.e. f(k) = kα, 0 < α < 1, and that the utility function is logarithmic, i.e.
σ = 1. Using the details in the Appendix, we have for 1 ≤ t < Tp,
ct = (1− β)
∙
kt + kαt +
we(t)
re(t)− 1 −
τ 0re(t)
re(t)− 1 + (τ 0 − τ 1)
re(t)t−Tp
1− re(t)−1
¸
(26)
and for t ≥ Tp we have
ct = (1− β)
∙
kt + kαt +
we(t)
re(t)− 1 −
τ 1re(t)
re(t)− 1
¸
. (27)
The dynamics of expectations are given by
re(t+ 1) = re(t) + γ(rt − re(t)),
we(t+ 1) = we(t) + γ(wt − we(t)).
and the initial conditions are given by the “old” steady state. The Appendix
shows that the jump in consumption in period 1 is
c1 − c0 = (τ 0 − τ 1)βTp−1, (28)
19In principle, they can also estimate the steady state value k¯, which is not needed in
the forecasting. Alternatively, if the intercepts are known, the slope coeﬃcients can be
estimated, see Section 4.8.1 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
20This assumption diﬀers from what was assumed for the endowment economy in Section
3.2, where agents’ consumption is a function of the actual rt+1, which is determined as
part of the temporary equilibrium. For the endowment economy the adopted assumption
is the only natural formulation.
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whereas the jump in consumption under perfect foresight is
(τ 0 − τ 1)(λ−11 )Tp−1,
where λ1 is the unstable root in the perfect foresight dynamics.21 It can be
shown that λ−11 < β, so that the fall in consumption is greater under learning
than under perfect foresight dynamics. This is confirmed by the numerical
simulations below. More generally, our aim is to compare the paths of ct and
kt under steady state learning and under perfect foresight using numerical
simulations.
The computation of the paths under learning is straightforward and we
can just generalize the procedures in earlier settings. For perfect foresight
dynamics the new (though well-known) feature is that, with durable capi-
tal, the dynamics are computed using saddle-path stability conditions of the
perfect foresight paths. The computation of perfect foresight path can either
be done directly from the nonlinear setting using shooting-algorithms or us-
ing a linear approximation to the model to compute the backward-forward
solution. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2003), Chapter 11 for a discussion of
these approaches. For our analysis we opt for the linearization technique.22
We now compare the dynamics of consumption and capital under steady
state learning and under perfect foresight. The following parameter values
are assumed in the simulations: Tp = 20, γ = 0.1, β = 0.95, α = 0.3, g0 = 0.9
and g1 = 1.1. Figure 7 presents the results for consumption. The solid curve
gives the dynamics of consumption under learning and the dashed curve
under perfect foresight. (The horizontal dashed line indicates the new steady
state.) The perfect foresight path verifies the features asserted earlier: an
initial negative jump and a gradual decline afterwards towards the new steady
state. Under learning the initial negative jump is bigger than under under
perfect foresight and the path is non-monotonic; consumers want to “correct”
the big negative jump and consumption starts to increase, though eventually
after the actual policy change consumption starts to decline. Another notable
feature in the simulation is that the learning path actually undershoots the
new steady state value.
21Analytical details of the Ramsey model in the perfect foresight case are standard, see
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2003), Chapter 11, and are available on request.
22The shooting algorithm involves fixing an arbitrary long but finite horizon at which
the numerically calculated path is close to the steady state. The approximate PF paths
will eventually diverge because of numerical approximations about the switch point and
the saddle path at the time of the actual policy change.
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Figure 7: Consumption dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect
foresight (dashed curve). The dashed straight line is the new steady state
for consumption.
The next figure shows the dynamics of the capital stock under learning
and under perfect foresight, the solid and dashed curves, respectively. (The
horizontal dashed line again indicates the new steady state.) For a good part
the dynamics of the adjustment of capital are qualitatively similar under
learning and perfect foresight. A notable diﬀerence is that under learning
the capital stock seems to undershoot the new steady state value, whereas
the decline towards the new steady state is monotonic under perfect foresight.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a methodology for studying the eﬀects of antici-
pated policy changes on the dynamics of learning paths. We have examined
this issue using models that are well behaved in the sense that adaptive or
statistical learning rules converge asymptotically to rational expectations in
stationary environments. A disadvantage of purely adaptive learning is that
it is not forward-looking. Our framework overcomes this limitation by as-
suming that agents combine structural information about future policy with
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Figure 8: Dynamics of kt under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight
(dashed curve). The dashed straight line is the new steady state of kt.
adaptive learning for the remaining variables they are required to forecast.
To develop our analysis we employed simple models of fiscal policy. In
these frameworks it is plausible to assume that credible plans for the paths
of government policy variables are structural information that agents can
incorporate into their forecasting procedures. Likewise, government budget
constraints are plausible candidates for structural information that agents
exploit in making their forecasts.
The cases we have examined are natural formulations of the general idea
that, depending on the context, there may be structural knowledge that is
available and used even when agents have much more imperfect information
about the determinants of aggregate variables than presumed by the rational
expectations hypothesis. Cases of partial structural knowledge lead to mod-
ifications of both the way agents make forecasts and their behavioral rules
when learning. In our context, agents incorporated the future changes in
government fiscal variables into behavioral rules with long horizons, combin-
ing the structural tax forecasts with adaptive learning rules for forecasting
interest rates and wages.
Our analysis focused on a few very stylized economies in order to study
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these ideas in a simple setting. Quite clearly, similar ideas can be exploited
in more complex models. Some direct extensions of the models in this paper
would also be important. In particular, extending the modelling to settings
with random shocks has priority for future research. This is because formula-
tion of statistical learning rules is more straightforward in stochastic settings.
An example of this is the Ramsey model in which a stochastic framework
would allow agents to forecast interest rates and wages by estimating and
updating standard statistical models. Randomness also arises naturally in
connection with policy announcements. One case is uncertainty about the
date at which the policy change is implemented. A second case of uncertainty
about policy is the imperfect credibility of future policy announcements.
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Appendix: Derivations and Proofs
A Endowment Economy
A.1 Permanent changes in policy
Under learning we have
SD(t) =
∞X
j=1
βj/σ{rt+1re(t)j−1}σ−1−1 = rσ−1−1t+1 βσ
−1
∞X
j=1
{βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1}j−1
= rσ
−1−1
t+1 β
σ−1 1
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
. (29)
For t = 1, 2, ..., Tp − 1, we evaluate SN(t) as
SN(t) ≡ y
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1 −
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1τ et+j
=
yr−1t+1
1− re(t)−1 − {τ0r
−1
t+1
T−1X
j=1
(re(t))1−j + τ 1r−1t+1
∞X
j=T
(re(t))1−j}(30)
=
yr−1t+1
1− re(t)−1 − τ 0r
−1
t+1
1− (re(t))1−T
1− (re(t))−1 − τ 1r
−1
t+1
(re(t))1−T
1− (re(t))−1 ,
where T is the number of periods until Tp, i.e., T = Tp − t. Note that the
computation of SN(t) above assumes that τ t = τ 0 when t < Tp and τ t = τ 1
when t ≥ Tp. Hence, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1,
SN(t) ≡
y − τ 0 + (τ 0 − τ 1)(re(t))t+1−Tp
rt+1(1− (re(t))−1)
.
We compute rt+1 from the market clearing condition for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1,
rσ
−1−1
t+1 rt+1 =
y − τ 0 + (τ 0 − τ 1)(re(t))t+1−Tp
(1− (re(t))−1)(y − τ 0)βσ
−1 (1− βσ
−1
re(t)σ
−1−1),
which yields the solution for rt+1, when 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1, as
rt+1 = [
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
βσ
−1
(1− (re(t))−1)
{1− (τ 1 − τ0)
(y − τ 0)
(re(t))t+1−Tp}]σ.
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On the other hand, for t ≥ Tp, we have
SN(t) ≡
y − τ 1
rt+1(1− (re(t))−1)
and the corresponding rt+1 for, t ≥ Tp, is
rt+1 = [
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
βσ
−1
(1− (re(t))−1)
]σ.
Proof of Proposition 1:
First consider periods 1, . . . , Tp − 1. We have
re(t+ 1) = G(re(1), γ, t) where
G(re(1), γ, t) = re(1) + γ
tX
i=1
(H(re(i), i)− re(i)) .
Initially we have re(1) = β−1. Clearly G(β−1, 0, t) = β−1. From equation
(16) we also have H(β−1, i) < β−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ Tp − 1. This implies that
∂
∂γ
G(β−1, 0, t) =
tX
i=1
¡
H(β−1, i)− β−1
¢
< 0.
This proves (a) for periods t = 1, . . . , Tp − 1.
Next, consider period Tp:
re(Tp + 1) = (1− γ)re(Tp) + γrTp+1
= (1− γ)re(Tp) + γ
1− β
β
re(Tp)
re(Tp)− 1
,
where we have used the formula for rTp+1 in (16). Introducing temporary
notation x = re(Tp) we have re(Tp + 1) < β−1 iﬀ
(1− γ)x+ 1− β
β
x
x− 1 < β
−1.
As x ≥ 1 by rearranging the terms we have that re(Tp + 1) < β−1 iﬀ
(1− γ)x(x− 1) + γ 1− β
β
x < β−1(x− 1), i.e.
(1− γ)(x− β−1)(x− (1− γ)−1) < 0.
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Thus, re(Tp + 1) < β−1 iﬀ (1 − γ)−1 < x < β−1, which is true as, by the
earlier arguments,
x = re(Tp) = G(β−1, γ, Tp − 1) < β−1
for γ > 0 suﬃciently small. For t ≥ Tp + 2 we can repeat the argument. To
complete the proof for part (a) we note that for re(t) < β−1 we have
re(t+ 1)
re(t)
= (1− γ) + γ 1− β
β
1
re(t)− 1 > 1.
This implies that re(t + 1) is a strictly increasing sequence and clearly its
limit must be β−1.
To prove part (b) we first note that H(β−1, t) < β−1 and hence by con-
tinuity rt+1 = H(re(t), t) < β−1 for t = 2, . . . , Tp − 1 when γ is suﬃciently
small. For t ≥ Tp we have
rt+1 =
1− β
β
1
1− (re(t))−1 > β
−1
as re(t) < β−1 holds for all t ≥ 2 by part (a). Using the same formulae,
we also have limt→∞ rt+1 = β−1 as limt→∞ re(t) = β−1 by part (a) of the
Proposition. Q.E.D.
A.2 Temporary policy changes
The consumption function is as in (13) and SD(t) is as in (15). For 1 ≤ t ≤
Tg1 − 1, we have
SN(t) ≡ y
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1 −
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1τ et+j =
yr−1t+1
1− re(t)−1
−τ 0r−1t+1
T1−1X
j=1
(re(t))1−j − τ 1r−1t+1
T2−1X
j=T1
(re(t))1−j − τ 0r−1t+1
∞X
j=T2
(re(t))1−j
=
yr−1t+1
1− re(t)−1 − τ 0r
−1
t+1
1− (re(t))1−T1
1− (re(t))−1 −
τ 1r−1t+1(r
e(t))1−T1
1− (re(t))T1−T2
1− (re(t))−1 − τ 0r
−1
t+1
(re(t))1−T2
1− (re(t))−1 .
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where T1 = Tg1 − t, and T2 = Tg2 − t, are the number of periods remaining
until Tg1 and Tg2 respectively.
For Tg1 ≤ t ≤ Tg2 − 1,we have
SN(t) =
yr−1t+1
1− re(t)−1 − τ 1r
−1
t+1
1− (re(t))1−T2
1− (re(t))−1 − τ 0r
−1
t+1(r
e(t))1−T2
1
1− (re(t))−1
and finally for t ≥ Tg2,we get
SN(t) = (y − τ 0)r−1t+1(1− re(t)−1)−1.
As in Appendix A.1, we can solve for the interest rate rt+1. For 1 ≤ t ≤
Tg1 − 1, this is given by
rt+1 = [(
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
βσ
−1
(1− (re(t))−1)
){1− (τ 1 − τ 0)
(y − τ0)
(re(t))t+1−Tg1(1− re(t)Tg1−Tg2)}]σ.
When Tg1 ≤ t ≤ Tg2 − 1, the interest rate rt+1 is given by
rt+1 = [(
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
βσ
−1
(1− (re(t))−1)
){1 + (τ 1 − τ 0
y − τ 1
)re(t)t+1−Tg2}]σ,
and finally for t ≥ Tg2, we have
rt+1 = [
1− βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1
βσ
−1
(1− (re(t))−1)
]σ.
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove part (a), we first note that for 2 ≤ t ≤ Tg1
re(t+ 1) = G˜(re(1), γ, t), where
G˜(re(1), γ, t) = re(1) + γ
tX
i=1
(F (re(i), i)− re(i)) ,
using equation (18). In this expression
F (β−1, t) = β−1[1− a1βTg1−t−1(1− βTg2−Tg1) < β−1,
where a1 = τ1−τ0y−τ0 , and
∂
∂γ
G˜(β−1, 0, t) < 0.
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As in Proposition 1, it follows that re(t) < β−1 for γ > 0 suﬃciently small.
To prove the second assertion, we compute
∂re(Tg2)
∂γ
¯¯¯¯
γ=0
=
Tg2−1X
i=1
[ri+1 − re(i)]
¯¯¯¯
¯
γ=0
(31)
where re(i) = β−1 at γ = 0,
ri+1|γ=0 = β−1[1− a1(β−1)i+1−Tg1(1− βTg2−Tg1)
for i = 1, . . . , Tg1 − 1, and
rTg1+i
¯¯
γ=0 = β
−1[1 + a2βTg2−Tg1−i]
for i = 1, . . . , Tg2 − Tg1. Here a2 = τ1−τ0y−τ1 . Computing the sum (31) we get
∂re(Tg2)
∂γ
¯¯¯¯
γ=0
= −β−1a1
(1− βTg2−Tg1)(1− βTg1−1)
1− β
+β−1a2βTg2−Tg1−1
1− (β−1)Tg2−Tg1
1− β−1
.
Since τ 1 > τ 0 we have a1 < a2 and therefore to show that
∂re(Tg2)
∂γ
¯¯¯
γ=0
> 0 it
is suﬃcient that
βTg2−Tg1−1
β
β − 1(1− (β
−1)Tg2−Tg1)− (1− β
Tg2−Tg1)(1− βTg1−1)
1− β
= (1− β)−1[βTg1−1 − βTg2−1] > 0,
which holds since β < 1 and Tg2 > Tg1. The limit result follows an argument
analogous to the one used in the proof of Proposition 1. This completes the
proof of part (a).
To prove part (b), it is seen from above that F (β−1, t) is bounded strictly
below β−1 for t < Tg1. It then follows by continuity that F (re(t), t) < β−1
for all γ > 0 suﬃciently small. For t = Tg1 we have
rTg1+1 =
1− β
β(1− (re(t))−1)[1 + a2(r
e(t))Tg1+1−Tg2] > β−1
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since re(Tg1) < β−1. For t ≥ Tg2 we get
rt+1 =
1− β
β(1− (re(t))−1) < β
−1
since re(t) > β−1. Finally, the limit result follows from the convergence of
expectations to the steady state value. Q.E.D.
B Repeated Policy Learning
We have
∆t ≡
TH−1X
s=2
(
s−1Q
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(y − τ et+s) +
∞X
s=TH
(
s−1Q
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(y − τ et+s).
The second summation in ∆t can be simplified as follows
∞X
s=TH
(
s−1Q
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(y − τ et+s) = (y − g0)
∞X
s=TH
(
s−1Q
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1) =
(y − g0)
∞X
s=TH
(
TH−tQ
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(
s−1Q
i=TH−t+1
β) =
(y − g0)(
TH−tQ
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(
∞X
s=TH
βs+t−TH−1) = (y − g0)(
TH−tQ
i=1
(ret+i+1)
−1)(
βt−1
1− β ).
Combining with market clearing yields equation (19).
C Debt financing
We begin by noting that the actual evolution of debt is as follows:
bt = g¯0 − δ0 + rtbt−1, for t = 1, . . . , Tp1 − 1
bt = g¯1 − δ0 + rtbt−1, for t = Tp1, . . . , Tp2 − 1
bt = bTp2−1, for t ≥ Tp2.
Note that the level of debt is stabilized at bTp2−1 from date Tp2 onwards.
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Let bes(t) denote the time t forecast of bs. As bonds are pre-determined
the one-step ahead expectations of bonds satisfy bet+1(t) = bt+1. To forecast
the evolution of debt at time t we have for t = 1, . . . , Tp1 − 2 :
bet+1(t) = bt+1 = g¯0 − δ0 + rt+1bt,
bet+2(t) = g¯0 − δ0 + re(t)bt+1,
bes(t) = g¯0 − δ0 + re(t)bes−1(t), for s = t+ 3, . . . , Tp1 − 1,
bes(t) = g¯1 − δ0 + re(t)bes−1(t), for s = Tp1, . . . , Tp2 − 1,
noting that any date t, both bt and bt+1 are known.
At Tp1 − 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp2 − 3 we have
bet+1(t) = g¯1 − δ0 + rt+1bt,
bet+2(t) = g¯1 − δ0 + re(t)bt+1,
bes(t) = g¯1 − δ0 + re(t)bes−1(t), for s = t+ 3, . . . , Tp2 − 1.
At t = Tp2 − 2 we have
beTp2−1(Tp2 − 2) = g¯1 − δ0 + rTp2−1bTp2−2.
Using beTp2−1(t), agents forecast taxes by
τ es(t) = g¯1 + (β
−1 − 1)beTp2−1(t), for s ≥ Tp2 and t = 1, . . . , Tp2 − 2.
τ es(t) = τ s = g¯1 + (β
−1 − 1)bTp2−1, for s ≥ Tp2 and t ≥ Tp2 − 1.
One can use recursive substitution to solve further for the above formulas.
For example, when 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp1 − 2, we get
bet+3(t) = g¯0 − δ0 + re(t)bet+2(t) = g¯0 − δ0 + re(t)(g¯0 − δ0 + re(t)bt+1)
= (g¯0 − δ0)(1 + re(t)) + (re(t))2bt+1,
bet+4(t) = g¯0 − δ0 + re(t)bet+3(t)
= (g¯0 − δ0)(1 + re(t) + (re(t))2) + (re(t))3bt+1.
Continuing in this fashion, we inductively obtain for all 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp1 − 2,
beTp1−1(t) = (g¯0 − δ0)(1 + r
e(t) + ...+ (re(t))Tp1−3−t) + (re(t))Tp1−2−tbt+1
= (g¯0 − δ0)
1− (re(t))Tp1−2−t
1− re(t) + (r
e(t))Tp1−2−t(g¯0 − δ0 + rt+1bt).
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Thereafter continuing in the same fashion for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp2 − 2, we have
beTp1(t) = (g¯1 − δ0) + r
e(t)beTp1−1(t),
beTp1+1(t) = (g¯1 − δ0)(1 + r
e(t)) + (re(t))2beTp1−1(t),
beTp2−1(t) = (g¯1 − δ0)(1 + r
e(t) + ...+ (re(t))Tp2−1−Tp1) + (re(t))Tp2−Tp1beTp1−1(t).
The last line simplifies as below, so that for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp1 − 2, we finally have
beTp2−1(t) = (g¯1 − δ0)
1− (re(t))Tp2−Tp1
1− re(t) + (r
e(t))Tp2−Tp1beTp1−1(t).
We now move to the case when Tp1 − 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp2 − 3. Using the same
approach as before we get
bet+2(t) = g¯0 − δ0 + re(t)bt+1,
bet+3(t) = (g¯1 − δ0)(1 + re(t)) + (re(t))2bt+1,
beTp2−1(t) = (g¯1 − δ0)(1 + r
e(t) + ...+ (re(t))Tp2−t−3) + (re(t))Tp2−t−2bt+1
= (g¯1 − δ0)
1− (re(t))Tp2−t−2
1− re(t) + (r
e(t))Tp2−t−2bt+1,
where bt+1 = g¯1 − δ0 + rt+1bt.
Finally, for t = Tp2 − 2, we have
beTp2−1(Tp2 − 2) = g¯1 − δ0 + rTp2−1bTp2−2 = bTp2−1,
which is a known quantity at Tp2 − 2.
Given the tax and interest rate forecasts τ et+j(t) and re(t), consumption
demand at time t is given by (8), which may be rewritten as
ct =
rtbt−1 + y − τ t +
P∞
j=1(D
e
t,t+j(t))−1y −Q(t)
1 + SD(t)
; where (32)
Q(t) ≡
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1τ et+j(t). (33)
SD(t) can be simplified to (29), and the infinite sum in (32) simplifies to the
first term in (30).
The tax forecasts in equation (33), Q(t), are given by
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1. For t ≥ Tp2 − 1,
τ et+j(t) = τ t+j = g¯1 + (β
−1 − 1)bTp2−1 ≡ δ1
for all j ≥ 1 since bTp2−1 is known at time t ≥ Tp2 − 1. Hence,
Q(t) = δ1r−1t+1(1− re(t)−1)−1.
2. For 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp2 − 2,
Q(t) =
Tp2−1−tX
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))
−1δ0 +
∞X
j=Tp2−t
(Det,t+j(t))
−1δe1(t),
δe1(t) = g¯1 + (β
−1 − 1)beTp2−1(t),
where δe1(t) = τ es(t) for s ≥ Tp2, so that
Q(t) = δ0r−1t+1(
1− (re(t))−(Tp2−1−t)
1− re(t)−1 ) + δ
e
1(t)r
−1
t+1(
(re(t))−(Tp2−1−t)
1− re(t)−1 )
≡ r−1t+1Q˜(t), where Q˜(t) ≡
δ0 + (δe1(t)− δ0)(re(t))−(Tp2−1−t)
1− re(t)−1 .
Combining market clearing with (32) yields the interest rate solution from
rσ
−1
t+1β
σ−1(1−βσ−1re(t)σ−1−1)−1(y−gt) = (gt−τ t+rtbt−1)rt+1+
y
1− re(t)−1−Q˜(t).
D Ramsey model under learning
We need to compute the infinite sums involved in the right hand side of (22)
to evaluate consumption. Using (24)-(25), we get
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1(wet+j − τ et+j) = SW − ST1, where
SW =
we(t)
re(t)− 1 , t ≥ 1,
ST1 =
(
τ0
re(t)−1 + (τ 1 − τ 0)
re(t)t−Tp
1−re(t)−1 , 1 ≤ t < Tp,
τ1
re(t)−1 , t ≥ Tp.
.
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Furthermore, we assume that f(k) = kα, 0 < α < 1, and that σ = 1. The
infinite sum on the left hand side of (22), SD(t), equals β(1−β)−1 from (29)
when σ = 1. Hence, (26) follows. In addition, we have
rt = 1 + αkα−1t , wt = (1− α)kαt ,
k¯ =
µ
1− β
αβ
¶ 1
α−1
,
where k¯ is the steady state value of capital. For given level of government
spending g, steady state value of consumption is c¯ = (k¯)α − g.
We now compute the jump in consumption under learning dynamics.
As before, the dynamics start at the steady state so that k0 = k1 = k¯,
r1 = 1 + αk¯α−1, and w1 = (1 − α)k¯α. In addition, the initial estimates
satisfy re(0) = 1 + αk¯α−1 and we(0) = (1 − α)k¯α. These also imply that
re(1) = re(0) = 1 + αk¯α−1 and we(1) = we(0) = (1− α)k¯α.
At t = 1, the value of consumption from (26) is given by
c1 = (1− β)[k¯ + k¯α +
(1− α)k¯α
αk¯α−1
]− (1− β)τ 0(
1 + αk¯α−1
αk¯α−1
) +
(1− β)(τ 0 − τ 1)
(1 + αk¯α−1)2−Tp
αk¯α−1
.
Using the steady state value of k¯, it is easy to show that 1 + αk¯α−1 = β−1
and αk¯α−1 = β−1(1−β).With these values, one can show that the first term
in the expression above for c1 simplifies to k¯α, the second term to −τ 0, and
the third term to (τ 0 − τ 1)βTp−1. This finally proves that under learning we
have
c1 = k¯α − τ 0 + (τ 0 − τ 1)βTp−1 = c0 + (τ 0 − τ 1)βTp−1,
so that the jump in consumption is given by (28).
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